Is Bayesian Rationality Compatible with Strategic Rationality?

Marco Mariotti

Economic Journal, 1995, vol. 105, issue 432, 1099-1109

Abstract: In Bayesian game theory, each player obeys the Savage axioms and there is common knowledge of this. The author shows that two of the less controversial axioms (ordering and dominance) are incompatible with some elementary game theoretic principles. He furthermore argues that his impossibility result is the consequence of a more fundamental conflict between the states of nature/acts framework of decision theory and the principles of strategic rationality. Copyright 1995 by Royal Economic Society.

Date: 1995
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