Rent Seeking, Protectionism and Innovation in the American Steel Industry
Randall Morck and
Economic Journal, 1996, vol. 106, issue 435, 410-21
Trade protection in a declining industry can cause damages beyond those revealed in the usual trade diagram analysis. Using data on the U.S. steel firms, the authors show that trade protection in that industry rewards poor performance, reduces incentives to innovate, and frustrates the normal Schumpeterian process of creative destruction. Copyright 1996 by Royal Economic Society.
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (43) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0013-0133%2819960 ... 0.CO%3B2-P&origin=bc full text (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:106:y:1996:i:435:p:410-21
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... al.asp?ref=0013-0133
Access Statistics for this article
Economic Journal is currently edited by Martin Cripps, Steve Machin, Woulter den Haan, Andrea Galeotti, Rachel Griffith and Frederic Vermeulen
More articles in Economic Journal from Royal Economic Society Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing () and Christopher F. Baum ().