Rent Seeking, Protectionism and Innovation in the American Steel Industry

Stefanie Lenway, Randall Morck and Bernard Yeung

Economic Journal, 1996, vol. 106, issue 435, 410-21

Abstract: Trade protection in a declining industry can cause damages beyond those revealed in the usual trade diagram analysis. Using data on the U.S. steel firms, the authors show that trade protection in that industry rewards poor performance, reduces incentives to innovate, and frustrates the normal Schumpeterian process of creative destruction. Copyright 1996 by Royal Economic Society.

Date: 1996
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