Importing Credibility through Exchange Rate Pegging

Berthold Herrendorf

Economic Journal, 1997, vol. 107, issue 442, 687-94

Abstract: This paper employs an optimal taxation framework in order to study the credibility of monetary policy-making in an open economy. Since inflation is, in part, uncontrollable due to stochastic disturbances, the authority's actions cannot be monitored perfectly when the exchange rate floats, thus implying that reputational forces may become ineffective. In contrast, pegging the nominal exchange rate to a low-inflation currency allows perfect monitoring because the exchange rate is, in principle, controllable. For this reason, exchange rate pegging may import credibility and result in the best reputational equilibrium, even though the authority retains the discretion to devalue unexpectedly. Copyright 1997 by Royal Economic Society.

Date: 1997
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Working Paper: IMPORTING CREDIBILITY THROUGH EXCHANGE RATE PEGGING (1996)
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