A Laboratory Study of Group Polarisation in the Team Dictator Game

Timothy Cason and Vai-Lam Mui

Economic Journal, 1997, vol. 107, issue 444, 1465-83

Abstract: This paper introduces the team dictator game to study whether social dynamics within a group can cause groups' decisions to differ systematically from individuals' decisions. In the individual dictator game, a subject dictates the allocation of y dollars; in the team dictator game, a team of two subjects dictates the allocation of 2y dollars. The authors derive and test competing predictions for the two dominant psychological theories of group polarization in this context. The data indicate that team choices tend to be dominated by the more other-regarding member. This result is more consistent with social comparison theory than persuasive argument theory. Copyright 1997 by Royal Economic Society.

Date: 1997
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (163)

Downloads: (external link)
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0013-0133%2819970 ... 0.CO%3B2-X&origin=bc full text (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:107:y:1997:i:444:p:1465-83

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... al.asp?ref=0013-0133

Access Statistics for this article

Economic Journal is currently edited by Martin Cripps, Steve Machin, Woulter den Haan, Andrea Galeotti, Rachel Griffith and Frederic Vermeulen

More articles in Economic Journal from Royal Economic Society Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing () and Christopher F. Baum ().