Alternative Time Patterns of Decisions and Dynamic Strategic Interactions

Pierre Cahuc and Hubert Kempf ()

Economic Journal, 1997, vol. 107, issue 445, 1728-41

Abstract: This paper offers a simple approach to study steady-state Markov perfect equilibria arising in dynamic games when players (are obliged to) commit their actions for several periods. It highlights the importance of spillovers and dynamic strategic interactions when assessing the various time patterns conceivable in such games. The obtained results are then applied to various, either micro- or macroeconomic, issues where time patterns of decisions matter. Copyright 1997 by Royal Economic Society.

Date: 1997
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