The Electoral Politics of Extreme Policies

Amihai Glazer, Mark Gradstein and Kai Konrad

Economic Journal, 1998, vol. 108, issue 451, 1677-85

Abstract: A government may adopt extreme policies (policies lying outside the interval between the ideal points of the political parties) for electoral purposes. It can benefit when a change in policy is costly and when the opposing party cannot commit to maintaining the status quo.

Date: 1998
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Working Paper: The Electoral Politics of Extreme Policies (1995)
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