Minimum Wages for Ronald McDonald Monopsonies: A Theory of Monopsonistic Competition

V Bhaskar and Ted To

Economic Journal, 1999, vol. 109, issue 455, 190-203

Abstract: Recent empirical work on the effects of minimum wages has called into question the conventional wisdom that minimum wages invariably reduce employment. The authors develop a model of monopsonistic competition with free entry to analyze the effects of minimum wages and their predictions fit the empirical results closely. Under monopsonistic competition, they find that a rise in the minimum wage raises employment per firm, causes firm exit, and may increase or reduce industry employment. Minimum wages increase welfare if they raise industry employment but welfare effects are ambiguous if employment falls.

Date: 1999
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (189)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Working Paper: Minimum Wages for Ronald McDonald Monopsonies: A Theory of Monopsonistic Competition (1998)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:109:y:1999:i:455:p:190-203

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... al.asp?ref=0013-0133

Access Statistics for this article

Economic Journal is currently edited by Martin Cripps, Steve Machin, Woulter den Haan, Andrea Galeotti, Rachel Griffith and Frederic Vermeulen

More articles in Economic Journal from Royal Economic Society Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing () and Christopher F. Baum ().