Social Security: National Policies with International Implications

James Pemberton

Economic Journal, 1999, vol. 109, issue 457, 492-508

Abstract: Social security policies within individual countries are determined independently by national governments but the resulting outcome is inefficient compared with what would result from the international coordination of policies. This is because national social security policies produce international externalities via their effects on world interest rates. An illustrative example suggests that the gains from coordination are potentially significant.

Date: 1999
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