Negotiated Enforcement and Credible Deterrence

Luigi Alberto Franzoni

Economic Journal, 1999, vol. 109, issue 458, 509-35

Abstract: This paper develops a model of law enforcement in which indicted offenders and the prosecutor can negotiate the penalty prior to the completion of the investigation. The analysis focuses on the credibility of the conviction threat: the prosecutor cannot commit to any predetermined level of investigative effort should the negotiation fail. The settlement stage introduces several new features of the optimal enforcement policy, including the possibility that maximal sanctions may not be optimal. We show that the screening process associated with the negotiation stage reduces the incentives for the prosecutor to undertake thorough investigations and increases the rate of noncompliance.

Date: 1999
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:109:y:1999:i:458:p:509-35

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