Market Organisation and Trading Relationships

Gerard Weisbuch, Alan Kirman and Dorothea Herreiner

Economic Journal, 2000, vol. 110, issue 463, 411-36

Abstract: In this paper we give a theoretical model of buyers' behaviour on a market for a perishable good where no prices are posted. We show that if buyers learn from their own previous experience there is a sharp division between those who learn to be loyal to certain sellers and those who continue to "shop around". This feature remains in more general models which are simulated and is consistent with empirical data from the Marseille fish market.

Date: 2000
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (72)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Working Paper: Market Organisation and Trading Relationships (1998)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:110:y:2000:i:463:p:411-36

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... al.asp?ref=0013-0133

Access Statistics for this article

Economic Journal is currently edited by Martin Cripps, Steve Machin, Woulter den Haan, Andrea Galeotti, Rachel Griffith and Frederic Vermeulen

More articles in Economic Journal from Royal Economic Society Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing () and Christopher F. Baum ().