Centralised Wage Setting, Inflation Contracts, and the Optimal Choice of Central Banker

Phillip Lawler

Economic Journal, 2000, vol. 110, issue 463, 559-75

Abstract: The paper examines the appropriate design of central banking institutions in an economy in which the nominal wage is set by an inflation-averse monopoly union as a positive mark-up over its market-clearing value. The analysis considers both the optimal choice of central banker and the potential role for a linear inflation contract. The optimal set of arrangements is a central banker who attaches less significance to inflation than does society, combined with an inflation contract where the value of the contract parameter is related to the union's degree of inflation-aversion.

Date: 2000
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (42)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:110:y:2000:i:463:p:559-75

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... al.asp?ref=0013-0133

Access Statistics for this article

Economic Journal is currently edited by Martin Cripps, Steve Machin, Woulter den Haan, Andrea Galeotti, Rachel Griffith and Frederic Vermeulen

More articles in Economic Journal from Royal Economic Society Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing () and Christopher F. Baum ().