Performance-Based Wages in Tax Collection: The Brazilian Tax Collection Reform and Its Effects
Charles Kahn,
Emilson Silva and
James Ziliak
Economic Journal, 2001, vol. 111, issue 468, 188-205
Abstract:
We use panel data from the Brazilian tax collection authority to examine the effects of a major incentive reform instituted in 1989 to improve tax enforcement. Beforehand, fine collections per inspection were relatively stable; however, a striking trend break occurred afterwards, which we attribute to the incentive reform not to changes in the macroeconomy or personal and corporate income tax rates. Our estimates suggest the growth in fines per inspection after the reform is about 75% above what it would have been without it and that there is substantial heterogeneity in the impact of the reform across tax regions.
Date: 2001
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:111:y:2001:i:468:p:188-205
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