On Tariff Preferences And Delegation Decisions In Customs Unions: A Heckscher--Ohlin Approach

Constantinos Syropoulos ()

Economic Journal, 2002, vol. 112, issue 481, 625-648

Abstract: This paper studies preferences of customs union (CU) members over common external tariff (CET) levels and extends the literature on delegation decisions over trade policy in models with production. In a model with similar CU members, we prove that most--preferred CETs can be ranked with the help of compensated price elasticities of import demand functions. In the Heckscher--Ohlin trade model, we show these elasticities depend on inter--country differences in relative factor endowments and inter--sectoral differences in technology. This helps identify the optimal policy maker in a CU and demonstrates delegation decisions over trade policy can be integrated into mainstream trade theory. Copyright 2002 Royal Economic Society

Date: 2002
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