Optimal Discretionary Monetary Policy in a Model of Asymmetric Central Bank Preferences

Bob Nobay and David Peel

Economic Journal, 2003, vol. 113, issue 489, 657-665

Abstract: This paper considers optimal monetary policy in the context of the central bank adopting an asymmetric objective function. Our results show that under asymmetric preferences, many of the extant results on the time consistency problem need no longer hold. Copyright 2003 Royal Economic Society.

Date: 2003
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:113:y:2003:i:489:p:657-665

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