EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Sargent-Wallace meets Krugman-Flood-Garber, or: why sovereign debt swaps do not avert macroeconomic crises

Joshua Aizenman, Kenneth Kletzer and Brian Pinto

Economic Journal, 2005, vol. 115, issue 503, 343-367

Abstract: This paper argues that the frequent failure of the debt swaps follows from fundamental forces driven by the market's assessment of the scarcity of fiscal revenue relative to the demand for fiscal outlays. As a country approaches the range of partial default, swaps may not provide the expected breathing room and could even bring the crisis forward. Our methodology combines three independent themes: exchange rate crises as the manifestation of excessive monetary injections, the fiscal theory of inflation and sovereign debt. The integrated framework derives devaluation and external debt repudiation as part of a public-finance optimising problem. Copyright 2005 Royal Economic Society.

Date: 2005
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (25)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Working Paper: Sargent-Wallace Meets Krugman-Flood-Garber, or: Why Sovereign Debt Swaps Don't Avert Macroeconomic Crises (2002) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:115:y:2005:i:503:p:343-367

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... al.asp?ref=0013-0133

Access Statistics for this article

Economic Journal is currently edited by Martin Cripps, Steve Machin, Woulter den Haan, Andrea Galeotti, Rachel Griffith and Frederic Vermeulen

More articles in Economic Journal from Royal Economic Society Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing () and Christopher F. Baum ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:115:y:2005:i:503:p:343-367