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Relative Performance Evaluation Contracts and Asset Market Equilibrium

Sandeep Kapur and Allan Timmermann ()

Economic Journal, 2005, vol. 115, issue 506, 1077-1102

Abstract: We analyse the equilibrium consequences of performance-based contracts for fund managers. Managerial remuneration is tied to a fund's absolute and relative performance. Investors choose whether or not to delegate their investment to better-informed fund managers; if they delegate they choose the optimal contract subject to the fund manager's participation constraint. We find that the impact of relative performance evaluation on the equilibrium equity premium and on portfolio herding critically depends on whether the participation constraint is binding. Simple numerical examples suggest that the increased importance of delegation and relative performance evaluation may lower the equity premium. Copyright 2005 Royal Economic Society.

Date: 2005
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Working Paper: Relative Performance Evaluation Contracts and Asset Market Equilibrium (2005) Downloads
Working Paper: Relative Performance Evaluation Contracts and Asset Market Equilibrium (2004) Downloads
Working Paper: Relative Performance Evaluation Contracts and Asset Market Equilibrium (2004) Downloads
Working Paper: Relative Performance Evaluation Contracts and Asset Market Equilibrium (2003) Downloads
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