Governance Reform in Legal Service Markets

Paul Grout, Ian Jewitt and Silvia Sonderegger

Economic Journal, 2007, vol. 117, issue 519, C93-C113

Abstract: This article discusses proposed governance reforms of legal services markets. The model distinguishes between a status quo position supported by a system of professionally enforced collective reputation and forms of governance based more squarely on market mechanisms. We identify a number of forces which determine the success of reform. Focusing particularly on the "rent recapture" and "relationship substitution" effects, we highlight their impact on client welfare and quality of legal services in different types of market according to whether clients are transient or repeated users of the service. Copyright 2007 The Author(s). Journal compilation Royal Economic Society 2007.

Date: 2007
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Working Paper: Governance Reform in Legal Service Markets (2007)
Working Paper: Governance Reform in Legal Service Markets (2006)
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