 The Redistributive Design of Social Security SystemsJ. Ignacio Conde-Ruiz and Paola Profeta Economic Journal, 2007, vol. 117, issue 520, 686-712 Abstract: Countries with low intragenerational redistribution in social security systems (Bismarckian) are associated with larger public pension expenditures, a smaller fraction of private pension and lower income inequality than countries with more redistributive social security (Beveridgean). This article introduces a bidimensional voting model to account for these features. Agents different in age, income and in their ability to invest in the capital market vote on the degree of redistribution of the social security system and on the size of the transfer. In an economy with three income groups, a small Beveridgean system is supported by low-income agents, who gain from its redistributive feature, and high-income individuals, who seek to minimise their tax contribution and to invest in a private scheme. Middle-income individuals instead favour a large Bismarckian system. Copyright 2007 The Author(s). Journal compilation Royal Economic Society 2007. Date: 2007 There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:117:y:2007:i:520:p:686-712 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article Economic Journal is currently edited by Martin Cripps, Steve Machin, Woulter den Haan, Andrea Galeotti, Rachel Griffith and Frederic Vermeulen More articles in Economic Journal from Royal Economic Society Contact information at EDIRC. |
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