Preferences for Collective Versus Individualised Wage Setting

Tito Boeri and Michael Burda

Economic Journal, 2009, vol. 119, issue 540, 1440-1463

Abstract: Standard models of equilibrium unemployment assume exogenous labour market institutions and flexible wage determination. This article models wage rigidity and the coverage of collective bargaining endogenously, when workers differ by observable skill and may adopt either individualised or collective wage bargaining. In the calibrated model, a substantial fraction of workers and firms as well as the median voter prefer collective bargaining to the decentralised regime. A fundamental distortion of the separation decision in the form of a firing tax is necessary for these preferences to emerge. Endogenous coverage of collective bargaining can significantly modify the model's comparative statics predictions. Copyright © The Author(s). Journal compilation © Royal Economic Society 2009.

Date: 2009
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Journal Article: Preferences for Collective Versus Individualised Wage Setting (2009)
Working Paper: Preferences for Collective versus Individualised Wage Setting (2008)
Working Paper: Preferences for collective versus individualised wage setting (2008)
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