Government Outsourcing: Public Contracting with Private Monopoly
Emmanuelle Auriol and
Pierre Picard
Economic Journal, 2009, vol. 119, issue 540, 1464-1493
Abstract:
The article studies the impact of the government budget constraint on the regulation of natural monopolies in adverse selection contexts. The government maximises total surplus but incurs some cost of public funds "à la" Laffont and Tirole (1993). Government outsourcing is proposed as an alternative to regulation in which firms freely enter the market and choose their prices and output levels. However the government can contract "ex post" with the private firms. This "ex post" contracting set-up allows more flexibility than regulation where governments commit to both investment and operation cash-flows. This is especially relevant in case of high technological uncertainties. Copyright © The Author(s). Journal compilation © Royal Economic Society 2009.
Date: 2009
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (25)
There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.
Related works:
Journal Article: Government Outsourcing: Public Contracting with Private Monopoly (2009) 
Working Paper: Government outsourcing: public contracting with private monopoly (2009)
Working Paper: Government Outsourcing: Public Contracting with Private Monopoly (2008) 
Working Paper: Government Outsourcing: Public Contracting with Private Monopoly (2006) 
Working Paper: Government Outsourcing: Public Contracting with Private Monopoly (2006) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:119:y:2009:i:540:p:1464-1493
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... al.asp?ref=0013-0133
Access Statistics for this article
Economic Journal is currently edited by Martin Cripps, Steve Machin, Woulter den Haan, Andrea Galeotti, Rachel Griffith and Frederic Vermeulen
More articles in Economic Journal from Royal Economic Society Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing () and Christopher F. Baum ().