 Sequential Legislative Lobbying under Political CertaintyMichelLe Breton and Vera Zaporozhets () Economic Journal, 2010, vol. 120, issue 543, 281-312 Abstract: In this article, we analyse the equilibrium of a sequential game-theoretical model of lobbying, based on Groseclose and Snyder (1996) , describing a legislature that votes on two alternatives and two opposing lobbies, lobby 0 and lobby 1, that compete by bidding for legislators' votes. In this model there is a strong second-mover advantage, so the lobbyist moving first will make offers to legislators only if he deters any credible counter-reaction from his opponent, i.e. if he anticipates winning the battle. Our main focus is on the calculation of the smallest budget that he needs to win the game and on the distribution of this budget across the legislators. We study the impact of game's key parameters on these two variables and show the connection of this problem with the combinatorics of sets and notions from cooperative game theory. Copyright © The Author(s). Journal compilation © Royal Economic Society 2009. Date: 2010 There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:120:y:2010:i:543:p:281-312 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article Economic Journal is currently edited by Martin Cripps, Steve Machin, Woulter den Haan, Andrea Galeotti, Rachel Griffith and Frederic Vermeulen More articles in Economic Journal from Royal Economic Society Contact information at EDIRC. |
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