A Prize To Give For: An Experiment on Public Good Funding Mechanisms

Luca Corazzini, Marco Faravelli and Luca Stanca

Economic Journal, 2010, vol. 120, issue 547, 944-967

Abstract: This article investigates fund-raising mechanisms based on a prize as a way to overcome free riding in the private provision of public goods. We focus on an environment characterised by income heterogeneity and incomplete information about income levels. Our analysis compares experimentally the performance of a lottery, an all-pay auction and a benchmark voluntary contribution mechanism. We find that prize-based mechanisms perform better than voluntary contribution in terms of public good provision. Contrary to the theoretical predictions, contributions are significantly higher in the lottery than in the all-pay auction, both overall and by individual income types. Copyright © The Author(s). Journal compilation © Royal Economic Society 2009.

Date: 2010
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (58)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Working Paper: A Prize to Give for: An Experiment on Public Good Funding Mechanisms (2007)
Working Paper: A Prize to Give for: An Experiment on Public Good Funding Mechanisms (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:120:y:2010:i:547:p:944-967

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... al.asp?ref=0013-0133

Access Statistics for this article

Economic Journal is currently edited by Martin Cripps, Steve Machin, Woulter den Haan, Andrea Galeotti, Rachel Griffith and Frederic Vermeulen

More articles in Economic Journal from Royal Economic Society Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing () and Christopher F. Baum ().