Endogenous Market Structures and the Business Cycle

Federico Etro () and Andrea Colciago

Economic Journal, 2010, vol. 120, issue 549, 1201-1233

Abstract: We characterise endogenous market structures under Bertrand and Cournot competition in a DSGE model. Short-run mark ups vary countercyclically because of the impact of entry on competition. Long-run mark ups are decreasing in the discount factor and in productivity, and increasing in the exit rate and in the entry costs. Dynamic inefficiency can emerge due to excessive entry under Cournot competition. Positive temporary shocks attract entry, which strengthens competition so as to reduce the mark ups temporarily and increase real wages: this competition effect creates an intertemporal substitution effect which boosts consumption and employment. Endogenous market structures improve the ability of a flexible prices model in matching impulse response functions and second moments for US data. Copyright (C) The Author(s). Journal compilation (C) Royal Economic Society 2010.

Date: 2010
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Related works:
Working Paper: Endogenous Market Structures and the Business Cycle (2011)
Chapter: Endogenous Market Structures and Business Cycles (2009)
Working Paper: Endogenous Market Structure and the Business Cycle (2007)
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