On Union Preferences and Labour Market Models: Insiders and Outsi ders

Alan Carruth and Andrew Oswald

Economic Journal, 1987, vol. 97, issue 386, 431-45

Abstract: This paper constructs a model of trade-union behavior in which there is a distinction between "insiders" and "outsiders." This is used to examine one of the most troublesome issues in macroeconomic theory, namely, the extent to which a rise in aggregate demand might generate wage increases rather than growth in employment. A generalization of the most widely used union utility function is presented. The analysis reveals the conditions under which insiders will agree to let outsiders into employment, derives two-step wage preferences, and proves a new result on wage rigidity. Copyright 1987 by Royal Economic Society.

Date: 1987
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (61)

Downloads: (external link)
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0013-0133%2819870 ... 0.CO%3B2-1&origin=bc full text (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:97:y:1987:i:386:p:431-45

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... al.asp?ref=0013-0133

Access Statistics for this article

Economic Journal is currently edited by Martin Cripps, Steve Machin, Woulter den Haan, Andrea Galeotti, Rachel Griffith and Frederic Vermeulen

More articles in Economic Journal from Royal Economic Society Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing () and Christopher F. Baum ().