A Positive Economic Theory of Regulatory Enforcement

Paul Fenn and C G Veljanovski

Economic Journal, 1988, vol. 98, issue 393, 1055-70

Abstract: A positive economic model of regulatory enforcement is developed th at allows the agency to use both legal and informal methods to gain compliance with the law. The paper fills a gap in the economic literature on regulation by developing and testing a model of enforcement. It also provides a theoretical framework for the recent empirical work of political scientists and sociologists on enforcement practices. Copyright 1988 by Royal Economic Society.

Date: 1988
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

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