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Risk, Implicit Contracts and the Family in Rural Areas of Low-income Countries

Mark Rosenzweig

Economic Journal, 1988, vol. 98, issue 393, 1148-70

Abstract: Hypotheses concerning the relationship between insurance-based inco me transfers and the membership, size, and composition of households in low-income agricultural environments facing spatially-covariant incom e risks are formulated and tested using longitudinal data from India. T he influence of credit markets and inherited wealth on the ability of households to mitigate income volatility are also assessed and compared to implicit insurance-based familial transfer schemes. The results support hypotheses concerning the ex post consumption smoothing roles of hosuehold structure, and indicate as well the limitations of underdeveloped credit markets in providing income insurance in an agr icultural environment. Copyright 1988 by Royal Economic Society.

Date: 1988
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