Ex Ante Evaluation of Health States and the Provision for Ill-Health

Timothy Besley

Economic Journal, 1989, vol. 99, issue 394, 132-46

Abstract: This paper examines the motivation for States to intervene in the provisions that their citizens make for ill-health. The author examines arguments that relate to imperfect information and a kind of misperception which he calls evaluator relativity. He identifies ex post regret as being the force that may justify intervention that helps to sidestep some of the problems that arise when expected utility is invoked as a welfare criterion. Copyright 1989 by Royal Economic Society.

Date: 1989
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