Strategic Work Interactions and the Kibbutz-Kolkhoz Paradox

Joel M Guttman and Adi Schnytzer

Economic Journal, 1989, vol. 99, issue 397, 686-99

Abstract: The authors develop a model of strategic work interactions in collective enterprises explaining the following observation: the Israeli kibbutz, in which net collective output is distributed equally, has been an economic success, while the Soviet kolkhoz, in which net output traditionally was divided according to relative work input, has been a failure. In contrast, the conventional Cournot-Nash theory of collective enterprises predicts superoptimal output in the kolkhoz, while in the kibbutz, the free-fider problem is predicted to lead to suboptimal effort. Their theory predicts Pareto optimal work effort in the kibbutz and suboptimal effort in the kolkhoz. Copyright 1989 by Royal Economic Society.

Date: 1989
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0013-0133%2819890 ... 0.CO%3B2-R&origin=bc full text (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:99:y:1989:i:397:p:686-99

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... al.asp?ref=0013-0133

Access Statistics for this article

Economic Journal is currently edited by Martin Cripps, Steve Machin, Woulter den Haan, Andrea Galeotti, Rachel Griffith and Frederic Vermeulen

More articles in Economic Journal from Royal Economic Society Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing () and Christopher F. Baum ().