Promises, Promises: Credible Policy Reform via Signalling

Dani Rodrik

Economic Journal, 1989, vol. 99, issue 397, 756-72

Abstract: Empirical experience and theory both suggest that policy reforms can be aborted or reversed if they lack sufficient credibility. One reason for credibility problems is the doubt regarding how serious the government really is about the reform. This paper considers a framework in which the private sector is unable to distinguish between a genuinely reformist government and a government that simply feigns interest in reform because it is a precondition for foreign assistance. The general conclusion is that the magnitude of the reform may serve to convey the government's future intentions and, hence, act as a signal of its "type." Copyright 1989 by Royal Economic Society.

Date: 1989
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Working Paper: Promises, Promises: Credible Policy Reform via Signaling (1988)
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