Monopoly Provision of Quality and Warranties: An Exploration in the Theory of Multidimensional Screening

Steven Matthews () and John Moore

Econometrica, 1987, vol. 55, issue 2, 441-67

Abstract: New ways of handling incentive constraints between nonadjacent types of buyer are used to solve a monopoly screening problem. The monopoly wishes to price discriminate by designing a product line of goods distinguished by different quality, warranty, and price attributes. The multidimensionality of the line causes the local approach usually taken to fail. The optimal product line is nevertheless fully characterized. Contrary to the result always obtained in simple models, attributes need not be monotone in buyer type, e.g., more eager types sometimes receive lower quality. Copyright 1987 by The Econometric Society.

Date: 1987
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Working Paper: Monopoly Provision of Quality and Warranties: An Exploration in the Theory of Multidimensional Screening (1985)
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