On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting

Dilip Abreu

Econometrica, 1988, vol. 56, issue 2, 383-96

Abstract: This paper presents a systematic framework for studying infinitely-repeated games with discounting, focusing on pure strategy (subgame) perfect equilibria. It introduces a number of concepts whi ch organize the theory in a natural way. These include the idea of an optimal penal code, and the related notions of simple penal codes an d simple strategy profiles. Copyright 1988 by The Econometric Society.

Date: 1988
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