Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation

Tatsuyoshi Saijo

Econometrica, 1988, vol. 56, issue 3, 693-700

Abstract: Contributions by E. Maskin and S. Williams have established that any social choice cor respondence satisfying monotonicity, no veto power, and having at lea st three participants is Nash implementable under the proviso that th e number of social alternatives is finite and that the correspondence satisfies citizen sovereignty. The author makes improvements in two aspects of their Nash implementation theorems: a reduction in the str ategy space and a proof for an arbitrary alternative set. Each partic ipant announces two participants' preferences, an alternative, and a positive integer. With this strategy space specification, the author confirms Maskin's theorem for an arbitrary size of the alternative se t. Copyright 1988 by The Econometric Society.

Date: 1988
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (59)

Downloads: (external link)
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%2819880 ... O%3B2-7&origin=repec full text (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:56:y:1988:i:3:p:693-700

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.economet ... ordering-back-issues

Access Statistics for this article

Econometrica is currently edited by Guido Imbens

More articles in Econometrica from Econometric Society Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().