Information Aggregation in an Experimental Market

Robert Forsythe () and Russell Lundholm

Econometrica, 1990, vol. 58, issue 2, 309-47

Abstract: In this study, the authors report the results from laboratory asset markets designed to test the rational expectations hypothesis that markets aggregate and transmit the information of differentially informed traders. After documenting evidence in favor of the rational expectations model, they examine which features of their environment are necessary or sufficient to achieve an rational expectations equilibrium. The authors find that trading experience and common knowledge of dividends are jointly sufficient to achieve a rational expectations equilibrium, but that neither is a sufficient condition by itself. They also present some stylized facts about the convergence process leading to a rational expectations equilibrium. Copyright 1990 by The Econometric Society.

Date: 1990
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