Rationality, Computability, and Nash Equilibrium

David Canning

Econometrica, 1992, vol. 60, issue 4, 877-88

Abstract: Suppose two agents play a game, each using a computable algorithm to decide what to do, these algorithms being common knowledge. The author shows that it is possible to act rationally provided he limits his attention to a natural subset of solvable games and to opponents who use rational algorithms; the outcome is a Nash equilibrium. Going further, the author shows that rationality is possible on many domains of games and opposing algorithms but each domain requires a particular solution algorithm; no one algorithm is rational on all possible domains. Copyright 1992 by The Econometric Society.

Date: 1992
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