Self-Confirming Equilibrium

Drew Fudenberg and David Levine

Econometrica, 1993, vol. 61, issue 3, 523-45

Abstract: In a self-confining equilibrium, each player's strategy is a best response to his beliefs about the play of his opponents and each player's beliefs are correct along the equilibrium path of play. Thus, if a self-confirming equilibrium occurs repeatedly, no player ever observes play that contradicts his beliefs, even though beliefs about play at off-path information sets need not be correct. The authors characterize the ways in which self-confirming equilibria and Nash equilibria can differ and provide conditions under which self-confirming equilibria correspond to standard solution concepts. Copyright 1993 by The Econometric Society.

Date: 1993
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Working Paper: Self-Confirming Equilibrium (1993)
Working Paper: Self-Confirming Equilibrium (1991)
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