Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
Hans Carlsson and
Eric van Damme
Econometrica, 1993, vol. 61, issue 5, 989-1018
A global game is an incomplete information game where the actual payoff structure is determined by a random draw from a given class of games and where each player makes a noisy observation of the selected game. For 2 x 2 games, it is shown that, when the noise vanishes, iterated elimination of dominated strategies in the global game forces the players to conform to J. C. Harsanyi and R. Selten's risk dominance criterion. Copyright 1993 by The Econometric Society.
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Working Paper: Global Games and Equilibrium Selection (1993)
Working Paper: Global games and equilibrium selection (1993)
Working Paper: GLOBAL GAMES AND EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION (1990)
Working Paper: Global games and equilibrium selection (1990)
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