Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers

Randolph McAfee

Econometrica, 1993, vol. 61, issue 6, 1281-1312

Abstract: A dynamic model with many sellers and buyers is constructed. Agents failing to trade may trade in the next period. An equilibrium is found where sellers hold identical auctions and buyers randomize over the sellers they visit. The distribution of buyer valuations is endogenous. An auction with efficient reserve is an optimal mechanism from each seller's point of view, in spite of the ability of any seller to alter the distribution of buyer types participating in the seller's mechanism by altering the mechanism. Copyright 1993 by The Econometric Society.

Date: 1993
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