t or 1 minus t. That Is the Trade-Off

Donald E Campbell and Jerry S Kelly

Econometrica, 1993, vol. 61, issue 6, 1355-65

Abstract: A social welfare function f is Arrowian if it has transitive values and satisfies Arrow's independence axiom. For any fraction t and any Arrowian f, either there will be some individual who dictates on a subset containing at least the fraction t of outcomes, or at least the fraction 1 minus t of the pairs of outcomes have their social ranking fixed independently of individual preference. And for any Arrowian f, there is a set containing a large fraction of the citizens whose preferences are never consulted in determining the social ranking of a large fraction of the pairs of alternatives. Copyright 1993 by The Econometric Society.

Date: 1993
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