Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information
Mathias Dewatripont () and
Patrick Rey ()
Econometrica, 1994, vol. 62, issue 2, 257-82
It has been emphasized that when contracts are incomplete (e.g., because some relevant variables are not verifiable by outsiders), the possibility of contract negotiation may prevent achieving desirable allocations that could be implemented otherwise. The authors analyze a situation where renegotiation is always possible but contracts can influence the renegotiation process; they show that some flexibility in the choice of this process allows to achieve efficiency in a variety of situations, including optimal risk-sharing and investment decisions. Copyright 1994 by The Econometric Society.
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Working Paper: Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information (1994)
Working Paper: Renegotiation design with unverifiable information (1994)
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