A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core

Motty Perry and Philip Reny ()

Econometrica, 1994, vol. 62, issue 4, 795-817

Abstract: A noncooperative implementation of the core is provided for games with transferable utility. The implementation obtained here is meant to reflect the standard motivation for the core as closely as possible. In the model proposed, time is continuous. This idealized treatment of time is most amenable for capturing an essential feature of the core--there is always time to reject a noncore proposal before it is consumated. Copyright 1994 by The Econometric Society.

Date: 1994
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (102)

Downloads: (external link)
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%2819940 ... O%3B2-Z&origin=repec full text (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:62:y:1994:i:4:p:795-817

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.economet ... ordering-back-issues

Access Statistics for this article

Econometrica is currently edited by Guido Imbens

More articles in Econometrica from Econometric Society Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().