The Value Allocation of an Economy with Differential Information

Stefan Krasa and Nicholas C Yannelis

Econometrica, 1994, vol. 62, issue 4, 881-900

Abstract: The authors analyze the Shapley value allocation of an economy with differential information. They address the following questions: How do coalitions of agents share their private information? How can one measure the information advantage or superiority of an agent? Is each agent's private information verifiable by other members of a coalition? Do coalitions of agents pool their private information? Do agents have an incentive to report their true private information? Do value allocations exist in an economy with differential information? The authors provide answers to each of these questions. Copyright 1994 by The Econometric Society.

Date: 1994
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