The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information

Drew Fudenberg, David Levine and Eric Maskin

Econometrica, 1994, vol. 62, issue 5, 997-1039

Abstract: The authors study repeated games in which players observe a public outcome that imperfectly signals the actions played. They provide conditions guaranteeing that any feasible, individually rational payoff vector of the stage game can arise as a perfect equilibrium of the repeated game with sufficiently little discounting. The central condition requires that there exist action profiles with the property that, for any two players, no two deviations--one by either player--give rise to the same probability distribution over public outcomes. The results apply to principal-agent, partnership, oligopoly, and mechanism-design models, and to one-shot games with transferable utilities. Copyright 1994 by The Econometric Society.

Date: 1994
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Related works:
Working Paper: The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information (1994)
Working Paper: The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information (1994)
Working Paper: THE FOLK THEOREM WITH INPERFECT PUBLIC INFORMATION (1989)
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