Negative Externalities May Cause Delay in Negotiation

Philippe Jehiel () and Benny Moldovanu ()

Econometrica, 1995, vol. 63, issue 6, 1321-35

Abstract: The authors study the strategic equilibria of a negotiation game where potential buyers are affected by identity-dependent, negative externalities. The unique equilibrium of long, finitely repeated generic games can either display delay--where a transaction can take place only in several stages before the deadline--or, in spite of the random element in the game, a well-defined buyer exists that obtains the object with probability close to one. Copyright 1995 by The Econometric Society.

Date: 1995
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