EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Reputation and Commitment in Two-Person Repeated Games without Discounting

Martin Cripps and Jonathan Thomas ()

Econometrica, 1995, vol. 63, issue 6, 1401-19

Abstract: Two-person repeated games with no discounting are considered where there is uncertainty about the type of the players. If there is a possibility that a player is an automaton committed to a particular pure or mixed stage-game action, then this provides a lower bound on the Nash equilibrium payoffs to a normal type of this player. The lower bound is the best available and is robust to the existence of other types. The results are extended to the case of two-sided uncertainty. This work extends Schmidt (1993) who analyzed the restricted class of conflicting interest games. Copyright 1995 by The Econometric Society.

Date: 1995
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (27) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%2819951 ... O%3B2-T&origin=repec full text (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:63:y:1995:i:6:p:1401-19

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.economet ... ordering-back-issues

Access Statistics for this article

Econometrica is currently edited by Guido Imbens

More articles in Econometrica from Econometric Society Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().

 
Page updated 2022-08-07
Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:63:y:1995:i:6:p:1401-19