The Democratic Political Economy of Progressive Income Taxation

John Roemer

Econometrica, 1999, vol. 67, issue 1, 1-20

Abstract: Why do both left and right political parties typically propose progressive income taxation schemes in political competition? Analysis of this problem has been hindered by the two-dimensionality space of admissible tax policies: Nash equilibria in pure strategies of the usual political game generically fail to exist. A new equilibrium concept, based on the fact of factional conflict within parties, is introduced. Each party has incomplete preference orders on the strategy space, formed as the intersection of the complete preference orders of its factions. Nash equilibria of the two-party game, so construed, do exist and, in such equilibria, both parties propose progressive income taxation.

Date: 1999
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (146)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Working Paper: THE DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PROGRESSIVE INCOME TAXATION (2003)
Working Paper: The Democratic Political Economy of Progressive Income Taxation (1997)
Working Paper: THE DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PROGRESSIVE INCOME TAXATION
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:67:y:1999:i:1:p:1-20

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.economet ... ordering-back-issues

Access Statistics for this article

Econometrica is currently edited by Guido Imbens

More articles in Econometrica from Econometric Society Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().