Assortative Matching and Search

Robert Shimer and Lones Smith

Econometrica, 2000, vol. 68, issue 2, 343-370

Abstract: In Becker's (1973) neoclassical marriage market model, matching is positively assortative if types are complements: i.e. match output is supermodular. We reprise this famous result assuming time-intensive partner search and transferable output. We prove existence of a search equilibrium with a continuum of types, and then characterize matching. After showing that Becker's conditions no longer suffice for assortative matching, we find sufficient conditions valid for any search frictions and type distribution: supermodularity not only of match output, but also of its marginal product and cross partial derivative. Symmetric submodularity conditions imply negatively assortative matching. Examples show these conditions are necessary.

Date: 2000
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Related works:
Working Paper: Assortive Matching and Search (1998)
Working Paper: Assortative Matching and Search (1997)
Working Paper: Assortative Matching and Search (1997)
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