Sequential Equilibria in a Ramsey Tax Model

Christopher Phelan and Ennio Stacchetti

Econometrica, 2001, vol. 69, issue 6, 1491-1518

Abstract: This paper presents a full characterization of the equilibrium value set of a Ramsey tax model. More generally, it develops a dynamic programming method for a class of policy games between the government and a continuum of households. By selectively incorporating Euler conditions into a strategic dynamic programming framework, we wed two technologies that are usually considered competing alternatives, resulting in a substantial simplification of the problem. Copyright The Econometric Society.

Date: 2001
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Working Paper: Sequential equilibria in a Ramsey tax model (1999)
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