Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility

Richard McLean and Andrew Postlewaite

Econometrica, 2002, vol. 70, issue 6, 2421-2453

Abstract: We examine a general equilibrium model with asymmetrically informed agents. The presence of asymmetric information generally presents a conflict between incentive compatibility and Pareto efficiency. We present a notion of informational size and show that the conflict between incentive compatibility and efficiency can be made arbitrarily small if agents are of sufficiently small informational size. Copyright The Econometric Society 2002.

Date: 2002
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (99)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Working Paper: Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility
Working Paper: Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:70:y:2002:i:6:p:2421-2453

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.economet ... ordering-back-issues

Access Statistics for this article

Econometrica is currently edited by Guido Imbens

More articles in Econometrica from Econometric Society Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().