Social Indeterminacy

Gil Kalai

Econometrica, 2004, vol. 72, issue 5, 1565-1581

Abstract: An extension of Condorcet's paradox by McGarvey (1953) asserts that for every asymmetric relation R on a finite set of candidates there is a strict-preferences voter profile that has the relation R as its strict simple majority relation. We prove that McGarvey's theorem can be extended to arbitrary neutral monotone social welfare functions that can be described by a strong simple game G if the voting power of each individual, measured by the Shapley-Shubik power index, is sufficiently small. Copyright The Econometric Society 2004.

Date: 2004
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