Large Robust Games

Ehud Kalai

Econometrica, 2004, vol. 72, issue 6, 1631-1665

Abstract: With many semi-anonymous players, the equilibria of simultaneous-move games are extensively robust. This means that the equilibria survive even if the simultaneous-play assumption is relaxed to allow for a large variety of extensive modifications. Such modifications include sequential play with partial and differential revelation of information, commitments, multiple revisions of choices, cheap talk announcements, and more. Copyright The Econometric Society 2004.

Date: 2004
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